Bergson's "Creative Evolution"--Thorough Mechanics, Biology and Physics-Chemistry."

Bergson's "Creative Evolution"--Thorough Mechanics, Biology and Physics-Chemistry."

Let me see. The price of Bergson's "Creative Evolution" is a thorough examination of mechanism and objectivism, and from this point on, the denial of mechanism and objectivism, or rather, the restriction of mechanism and objectivism, leads to the inability to talk about biological evolution in terms of objectivism. Incidentally, the next next section deals with the denial of "purpose".

The second and third sections are about philosophy, and as was mentioned in the previous section, real numbers and integers are different, I suppose. I don't know what real numbers are called in English, but the concepts of "gradation" and "continuity" were carefully discussed. In other words, just as you can't represent real numbers with integers, you can't represent continuity with a discrete structure.

Discrete mechanics maps a phenomenon onto a reduced discrete space, and cannot handle properties like the gradations that the real has, or the fact that each point is infinitely long. That is of course true, and perhaps this is in line with what Gödel proved.

Now, the mechanistic theory in Bergson has two characteristics. The first is "the same thing begets the same thing," which is like the circuit principle in Bergson's description. The second is the view that "the present contains everything," that is, the present contains the entire past. This is the position that consciousness does not connect only a part of the past to the present, but that the "state before one period" tells the whole story.

However, this is only true in the world of integers (the infinite world of one dimension) and not in the real world. The premise of mechanics is that "the same thing begets the same thing" and "the present has it all".

However, "the present has everything" is also somewhat misleading. The "present" here means that everything can be said in terms of "the state of affairs one period ago. If that is the case, unless we introduce the concept of confirmation, we would conclude that nothing is unpredictable.

Biological evolution cannot be well explained by such a mechanistic theory. Biological forms and functions, or evolution, can only be expressed in terms of real numbers, and combining them all would be infinite. The fact that it is infinite means that it cannot be handled by prediction or computation.

The premises of mechanistic theory are that the same thing produces the same thing, that everything can be told in the state before one period, and that everything is hit, but in the real world, phenomena are infinitely connected, and one change cannot tell the whole story.

One might ask what about the solar system, which seems to be isolated from nature, but is connected to the entire universe. The existence of living organisms is also not an isolated and closed system, but they always interact with each other somewhere. Therefore, I think that we cannot treat it as completely autonomous or closed.

Before concepts like "fractal" and "nonlinear" came along, if you didn't think about time at all, the ancients had a worldview like classical geometry. I see, there was no time. Later, with modern science, "time" came out, but it was also time as an independent variable, separated from space, or formalized time.

In recent years, however, concepts such as "probability" and "fractals" have appeared, and I believe that mathematics has gradually come closer to the existence of nature. In any case, the framework of mechanistic theory, i.e., "the same thing produces the same thing," "everything is determined by the state of affairs one period ago," and "everything is hit," does not adequately explain life. I believe that is what Bergson is saying.