Dissatisfaction of TEPCO affiliated company executives with the accident response and the structure of silence Before and after the accident Era

Dissatisfaction of TEPCO affiliated company executives with the accident response and the structure of silence Before and after the accident Era

The complaint of a TEPCO affiliate executive that he was told to gather people, even yakuza, at the site at the time of the accident is not merely a story of personal resentment. What these words indicate is the reality of how ad hoc and at the same time systematically irresponsible the response to the nuclear accident was. In times of emergency, the first priority was to secure manpower, regardless of the means. It was the upper management that imposed this decision on the work site, but the instructions were given orally and were not recorded. Even though they were aware of the illegality and danger, the atmosphere was dominated by the feeling that this was not the time to do anything about it.

It was a well-known fact among those involved at the nuclear power plant site at the time that there were front companies and human resource channels that were not publicly known to exist further outside the official subcontracting structure. But it was never publicly stated. There was a tacit understanding that everyone knew, but no one would talk about it, covering the entire organization. In times of emergency, that route would be mobilized, and when times returned to normal, it would be pretended that it had never existed. The speed and coldness of the switch lies at the heart of the executives' dissatisfaction.

As the accident moved toward a conclusion, the main body of TEPCO began to distance itself. Despite their strongly worded demands to gather people, they later change their attitude to say that they had nothing to do with it. By redrawing the lines without apology or explanation, only the affiliates and executives who took on the dirty work at the site are left to bear the shadow of responsibility. This disconnect is symbolic of the unique way responsibility is handled in Japan's large corporate organizations.

This discontent is discussed at the bar because it cannot be discussed in an official setting, nor can it be documented. Resignation and fatigue precede the accusations. Between the fact that the site would not have turned if it had not been done and the responsibility that no one is willing to accept, the words are pushed back into silence. This executive's narrative quietly demonstrates that the nuclear accident was not only a matter of technology, but also of organizational memory and responsibility handling.