What the Silence of Engineers Told Us about Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant: Long Years to Realize Safety is Culture (1980-2011)

What the Silence of Engineers Told Us about Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant: Long Years to Realize Safety is Culture (1980-2011)
A former senior executive with knowledge of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant during its operating period was often silent when asked why the cooling system was not fully understood by the senior management. The former executive, who knew the operating period of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, was silent when asked why senior management did not fully understand how the cooling system worked. A fault line of knowledge gradually formed between the design department, the operation department, and the management layer. The burden of complex equipment operation increased at the site, and the management layer increasingly relied on abstract indicators. This distance quietly led to the deterioration of the safety culture.

The IAEA has repeatedly stressed the importance of safety culture since 1991, but in Japan, power supply and cost efficiency were prioritized, experience transfer weakened, and procedure-centered operations became the norm. The silence of the former top management is a reflection of this structure. The silence of the former executives symbolized the difficulty of putting into words how such structural weathering had built up.

Safety is not established by the robustness of equipment, but by an organization's willingness to maintain a deep understanding of the intentions and limitations of technology. A culture of respect for technology that does not overlook the smallest signs is the power to prevent serious accidents. The words that followed the silence vividly illuminate the cultural challenges that the Japanese nuclear industry has faced from the 1980s to 2011.