The Sea of Poison and the Silent State: Chisso-Minamata Disease and Political Inaction (1950s-1970s)

The Sea of Poison and the Silent State: Chisso-Minamata Disease and Political Inaction (1950s-1970s)

From the late 1950s to the 1970s, Japan was in the midst of its "rapid economic growth. At a time when key industries such as steel, electricity, chemicals, and shipbuilding carried the prestige of the nation and were regarded as symbols of growth, the term "pollution" was still an unfamiliar and extremely "politically inconvenient" term to the general public.

In 1956, a "central nervous system disorder of unknown cause" was announced, and it was eventually discovered that the cause was organic mercury discharged into the sea from a chemical plant owned by the Chisso Corporation. However, the government, prefectural government, corporations, and even many media outlets remained silent about this "too obvious causal link" for a long time.

The reason for this was the national system, which was based on the supremacy of economic growth, and the reality of local economies caught up in this system. Chisso was not just a single company. It was a key employer in the town of Minamata, the center of tax revenues, and a "symbol of prosperity" for the region. Its employees and their families were widely rooted in the community and closely connected to the government and medical community.

Within this structure, victims suffered twofold. One is physical pain and death. The other is the mental isolation of being labeled a "traitor to the community" for speaking out. In other words, the more they voiced their suffering, the more they were excluded as "people who cause trouble.

This structure of silence was reinforced by the political inaction of the state. Both the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW) and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) repeatedly stated on the surface that they were "investigating," but behind the scenes they were trying to coordinate and calm down the situation with the companies. The media refrained from reporting the story due to their relationship with the business community, and it was not until the late 1960s that the victims' movement finally took off.

But here a further irony awaited. The moment "victims" were considered "activists," the state's treatment of them changed. As calls for Chisso to be held accountable and compensated grew stronger, the public security police moved in and intensified their surveillance of the rallies and demonstrations. For the state, the "problem" was replaced not by the actions of the perpetrators but by "citizens making a fuss.

Thus, Minamata disease was not just a local pollution case. It was structural proof of how postwar Japan, in the name of "growth," silenced human voices, cut off the weak, and protected corporations, and was the very breakdown of ethics between the state, capital, and citizens.

In the 1970s, as Yokkaichi asthma, Itai-itai disease, and Niigata Minamata disease became a chain reaction of social problems, the Basic Law on Pollution Control and the Environmental Agency (now the Ministry of the Environment) were established for the first time. However, this was the final stage of the "political movement through action," and Minamata's silence and isolation were the preconditions for this movement.