The Bitter Choice of False Reversion: Okinawa Reversion Negotiations and Japan's Subjugation Diplomacy

The Bitter Choice of False Reversion: Okinawa Reversion Negotiations and Japan's Subjugation Diplomacy

Japan's negotiations for the reversion of Okinawa to Japan are an extremely complex and symbolic diplomatic history, conducted within the context of the post-World War II occupation structure and the Cold War regime: following the Battle of Okinawa in 1945, Okinawa was placed under U.S. military rule, and the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty restored Japan's sovereignty over the island without relinquishing its administrative authority over it. For the next 27 years, Okinawa remained separated from mainland Japan and was the frontline of U.S. military strategy.

At the center of the negotiations over the reversion were two leading conservative politicians, brothers Nobusuke Kishi and Eisaku Sato. During a visit to the U.S. in 1957, Kishi requested President Eisenhower to return Okinawa to Japan, appealing that it was "the long-cherished wish of the Japanese people. However, the U.S. emphasized Okinawa's strategic value during the Cold War and did not agree to its reversion. The new Japan-U.S. Security Treaty of 1960, initiated by Kishi, only allowed the continuation of bases in Okinawa, and as a result, the "long-cherished wish" was left as an ideal.

Since becoming prime minister in 1964, Kishi's younger brother Eisaku Sato had made it his political mission to return Okinawa to Japan, something his brother had failed to do, and in a meeting with President Nixon in 1969, he secured the return of administrative authority in 1972. What must not be overlooked here, however, is that this reversion was not the result of equal negotiations between Japan and the United States, but rather a demonstration of the weakness of Japan's position, which lacked bargaining power. What emerges from the negotiations for the reversion of Okinawa is not so much that Japan sold it out, but rather the hidden reality that Japan lacked the ability to act as an independent nation and was bound by the "Security Treaty" to be subordinate to the United States.

The Sato Cabinet, which had hoped to somehow achieve the reversion of Okinawa, was torn between domestic public opinion and the military demands of the U.S., and after secret negotiations, it had no choice but to choose a form of reversion that would make a mockery of the Japanese people. On the surface, the cabinet declared "no nuclear weapons, same as on the mainland," but behind the scenes, it agreed to a secret agreement that tacitly approved the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan in an emergency. This clearly violated the "three non-nuclear principles," but the contradiction was kept from the public for a long time.

On May 15, 1972, Okinawa nominally returned to Japan. However, most of the U.S. military bases remained in place, and the lives and autonomy of the local residents remained restricted. Sato was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for this reversion, but behind the light of the Nobel Prize was the anguish of Okinawa, which had been turned into an "island of bases," and a nation lacking "true sovereignty.

The idealism of Nobusuke Kishi and the pragmatism of Eisaku Sato. The burden of "the reversion of Okinawa" that the brothers carried symbolizes the postwar contradictions and limitations of Japan, which, while maintaining the appearance of an independent nation, continues to be bound by the strategies of other nations. The reversion of Okinawa was not a proof of independence, but a painful choice to remove the mask of a "formally independent nation.